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As progress on experimental quantum processors continues to advance, the problem of verifying the correct
operation of such devices is becoming a pressing concern. The recent discovery of protocols for verifying com-
putation performed by entangled but non-communicating quantum processors holds the promise of certifying
the correctness of arbitrary quantum computations in a fully device-independent manner. Unfortunately, all
known schemes have prohibitive overhead, with resources scaling as extremely high degree polynomials in the
number of gates constituting the computation. Here we present a novel approach based on a combination of ver-
ified blind quantum computation and Bell state self-testing. This approach has dramatically reduced overhead,
with resources scaling as only O(m4 lnm) in the number of gates.
In recent years, significant progress has been made on the
development of quantum information processing technolo-
gies. Basic operations with fidelities exceeding those re-
quired for fault-tolerant quantum computation have already
been demonstrated in both ion-traps [1, 2] and superconduct-
ing systems [3]. The number of qubits available in a single
device is also approaching the limit of our ability to fully
characterize the device, due to the exponential growth in the
size of the state space. Quantum algorithms running on large
scale quantum computers hold the promise of dramatic reduc-
tions in run time for certain problems. However, as the size
of a quantum processor begins to exceed our ability to fully
characterize it, the question of whether one can trust results
produced in this manner naturally arises. For certain prob-
lems, such as integer factorization via Shor’s algorithm [4],
the results of the computation can be verified efficiently by a
classical computer. However, this property does not extend
to a number of important problems such as the simulation of
chemistry and other quantum systems [5].
While there is currently no known way to verify a sin-
gle adversarial quantum processor, two distinct approaches
have begun to emerge to the problem of verifying quantum
processors based on interrogation performed during computa-
tion. In the first approach, a quantum processor is repeatedly
queried by some other smaller quantum device, generally of
fixed size, which can be characterized by conventional means.
Aharonov, Ben-Or and Eban introduced an approach to such
quantum prover interactive proofs based on quantum authen-
tication using a fixed-sized quantum processor for the verifier
[6]. An alternative route to verification is based on the univer-
sal blind quantum computation (UBQC) protocol of Broad-
bent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi [7], which provides an uncondi-
tionally secure [8] protocol for hiding quantum computations
delegated to a remote server. By constructing the delegated
computation to include certain traps it is possible to verify
that the computation has been performed correctly, with ex-
ponentially small probability of error [9, 10]. These protocols
have extremely modest requirements for the verifier, simply
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the ability to prepare or measure single qubits in a finite set
of bases. As such, it has proven possible to implement blind
computation [11] and verification [12] in a system of four pho-
tonic qubits.
The second approach to verification is based on the inter-
rogation of two or more entangled but non-communicating
quantum processors. Reichardt, Unger and Vazirani [13]
showed that arbitrary quantum processing could be ver-
ified entirely classically utilizing the statistics of CHSH
games [14]. McKague [15] discovered an alternative ap-
proach using entangled processors based on measurement-
based computation, through a self-testing protocol for certain
graph states.
These two approaches have complimentary strengths and
weaknesses. The second approach provides a stronger secu-
rity guarantee, since the prohibition on communication be-
tween processors can be enforced through space-like separa-
tion of the devices. This removes the need for the verifier to
place trust in any pre-existing device, no matter how simple,
and can be said to be truly device independent: if the tests
are passed, the verifier can be confident in the result of the
computation even if quantum devices were constructed by an
adversary, without need for any characterization. However the
known protocols are only efficient in the theoretical sense, the
required resources scale as an extremely high degree polyno-
mial of the circuit dimensions. On the other hand, approaches
to verification based on blind computation are characterized
by far better resource scaling, with overhead scaling as low as
linearly in the circuit size. Here we present a hybrid approach,
in which self-testing is used to prepare the initial resource for
verifiable blind computation, and then the computation is im-
plemented using an existing blind computation scheme. The
resulting protocol is entirely device independent, while requir-
ing resources many orders of magnitude less than existing pro-
tocols.
Results
Before explaining our results it would be useful to discuss
what is meant by verifying a quantum computation. A veri-
fication protocol is such where a single verifier interacts with
one or more provers. The verifier accepts at the end of the
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2protocol if the output is correct, and should reject otherwise.
More formally, we say that a protocol with a quantum oper-
ator input U and a classical output to be correct if the output
is a possible result of measuring the state U |0〉 in the Pauli-X
basis. Following Definition 10 in [9], given any 0≤ ω < 1, a
protocol is ω-verifiable if for any choice of the prover’s strat-
egy the probability perror of the verifier accepting an incorrect
outcome is bounded by ω , perror ≤ ω .
When purely classical output is required, several blind
quantum computation protocols [7, 9, 16] have the property
that they can be decomposed into two phases: an initial state
distribution phase, where direct quantum communication is
used to prepare a fixed classical-quantum (CQ) correlation be-
tween the verifier’s classical system and the quantum proces-
sor to be tested, followed by an execution phase during which
purely classical communication is used to implement and ver-
ify the computation. Our approach is to replace the first phase
of an existing verification protocol, namely Protocol 6 intro-
duced in [9], with an alternate method of creating the same
correlation which admits a self-testing strategy. The second
phase of the protocol remains unaltered, and so security is
guaranteed if the initial state can be prepared with sufficiently
high fidelity.
Protocol 6 of [9] uses a cylindrical brickwork state as a re-
source. A vertex is randomly chosen to be a trap qubit. The
rest of the qubits in the row containing this trap and the qubits
in either the lower or the upper row, depending which is con-
nected to the trap qubit, are prepared in eigenstates of the com-
putational basis. This effectively disentangles the trap qubit
from the rest of the resource state which now acts as the usual
brickwork state originally used to achieve UBQC. Because the
trap qubit is separated from the rest of the state, the client has
a finite probability of detecting a cheating server.
Our remote state preparation procedure is inspired by a two-
device variant of the UBQC protocol [7, 17, 18]. Rather than
directly transmitting a quantum state from the verifier to the
server, measurements on one half of an entangled pair shared
between two devices are used to project the remote system
in a particular basis, thereby generating the desired correla-
tions. We will assume that the verifier’s device consists of a
simple measurement device capable of measuring individual
qubits in an arbitrary basis, inspired by the blind computation
approach taken by Morimae and Fujii [19], where Bob sends
the resource to Alice one qubit at a time and she performs
the computation using her device which effectively hides the
computation from a malicious Bob. We also require that Bob’s
subsystems are spatially separated such that measurements on
all of them can be performed in a space-like separated manner,
and that they be spatially arranged such that this separation is
apparent to Alice. We will treat the quantum part of the veri-
fier’s device and the quantum processor to be verified as (po-
tentially collaborating but non-communicating) adversaries,
yielding a situation in which there is a purely classical veri-
fier and N + 1 quantum provers. Alice’s quantum measuring
device is considered one of the provers while the remaining N
are in Bob’s possession and each of them sequentially sends
an EPR pair to be measured by Alice’s device. This sequential
transmission needs to occur in a sufficiently short time period
that all meaurements required by the protocol can be made
while respecting spacelike separation between the measure-
ment events for each prover. We shall refer to the verifier as
Alice and the quantum device to be verified as Bob, with the
distinction between the quantum and classical systems of Al-
ice clear from context. We retain the terminology of the single
prover setting, since, due to the asymmetry of the provers, it is
natural to think of our approach as a blind quantum computing
protocol in which Alice self-tests her own device.
At each step of phase one, Alice will receive a qubit from
Bob. She chooses randomly to either use that qubit for verifi-
cation purposes, or for the purpose of helping remotely create
the resource state that will be used in phase two. The two pro-
cedures can be intuitively thought of, and are best analysed, as
two distinct protocols. However it is crucial to keep in mind
that the two protocols are randomly interwoven and executed
in the same phase. This ensures that Bob has no knowledge
about which qubits are used for self-testing and which for re-
mote state preparation.
The self-testing procedure compares two experiments. The
reference experiment consists of a multipartite state |ψ〉Q on
Hilbert space Q and local observable TQ j , where j labels the
subsystem. The physical experiment consists of a multipartite
state |ψ〉S on Hilbert space S and local observable TS j . In order
to self-test operations and states with complex coefficients we
also require Hilbert space R, which is used to determine that
the devices either both apply the desired operator or they both
apply its complex conjugate. The physical experiment is said
to be ε-equivalent to the reference experiment if there exists a
local isometry Φ=ΦA⊗ΦB, such that∥∥∥∥Φ(TS j |ψ〉S) − 1√2
(
| junk1〉S⊗TQ j |ψ〉Q|00〉R
+ | junk2〉S⊗T ∗Q j |ψ〉Q|11〉R
)∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ε,
where ‖ · ‖2 is the vector distance defined for two vectors |a〉
and |b〉 as ‖|a〉− |b〉‖2 =
√
(〈a|− 〈b|)(|a〉− |b〉), and T ∗Q j is
the complex conjugate of TQ j . The state | junk〉S⊗ TQ j |ψ〉Q
represents the ideal state up to local isometry.
At every step of phase one, Bob is asked to prepare a
Bell pair 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), and send half of it to Alice. She
will measure the received qubit in a randomly chosen basis
α ∈ {XA,YA,ZA,DA,E±A ,FA}, where XA, YA, ZA are Pauli op-
erators, DA = 1√2 (XA + ZA), E
±
A =
1√
2
(±XA +YA) and FA =
1√
2
(YA + ZA). Here we use YA = Y and YB = −Y . After Al-
ice measures all of her qubits, she requests Bob to measure
all, except m randomly chosen qubits, of his qubits in ran-
dom basis β ∈ {XB,YB,ZB} and send her the result. Since the
state that is being verified is symmetric, Alice does not need to
test YAXB, ZAXB, or ZAYB. Furthermore, measurement settings
DAYB, E+A ZB, E
−
A ZB, FAXB are not necessary in our analysis.
There are in total 14 measurement settings that are required in
our self-testing analysis.
Alice collects all measurement results and at the end of
phase one she performs a statistical verification, deciding
whether, with some confidence p, every single one of the
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FIG. 1. Local isometry Φ used to identify the ideal state in
Bob’s device. The isometry is a reduced swap gate acting
individually on Bob’s subsystem and we can think of Φ as
extracting the desired state using the measured statistics.
qubits she received were part of a state ε˜-close to a Bell pair.
If this is the case, she proceeds to phase two. The verifica-
tion protocol used in this phase is based on the approach of
Mayers and Yao in [20, 21], which was greatly simplified and
further developed by McKague et al. in [22, 23]. This does
not require a trusted measurement device, and can be tailored
for any security parameters p and ε .
The graph state generation proceeds similarly to the UBQC
protocol [7, 9]. However, instead of Alice sending a pre-
pared qubit to Bob, Alice measures her half of the Bell pair
in order to collapse Bob’s half of the pair to one of the valid
input states. Specifically, the verification protocol for clas-
sical inputs and outputs which we will make use of (Proto-
col 6 of [9]), requires Alice to prepare and send to Bob, for
each qubit 1≤ j ≤m needed in the computation stage, a state
|ψ j〉 chosen uniformly at random either from the set {|0〉, |1〉}
or the set
{|+θ j〉}θ j∈A, where |+θ j〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ eiθ j |1〉) and
A = {0,pi/4, . . . ,7pi/4}. Here, instead of directly preparing
the state |ψ j〉, Alice instructs her measurement device to mea-
sure her half of the Bell pair in the basis {|+θ j〉, |−θ j〉}, where
|−θ j〉 = |+θ j+pi〉, if she wants to prepare a qubit in the x− y
plane, and in the computational basis if she wants to prepare
a dummy qubit. If she measures her half to be in the state
|+θ j〉, then she knows that Bob’s state is (with high proba-
bility) in the state |+−θ j〉. Similarly, if she measures |−θ j〉,
then she knows that Bob’s half is in the state |−−θ j〉. The
case of measurements in the computational basis is even sim-
pler. If Alice measures |s〉, where s ∈ {0,1}, then Bob’s qubit
will be prepared in the same state. Since Alice does not an-
nounce the angle θ j, and since the outcome of her measure-
ment is uniformly random, Bob has no information about the
input state. The state that they share is given by a CQ correla-
tion [7], with Alice holding a classical label for Bob’ state,
given by 12 ∑s∈{0,1} |s〉〈s|A ⊗ |s〉〈s|B for dummy qubits and
1
8 ∑θ j∈A |θ j〉〈θ j|A⊗|+−θ j〉〈+−θ j |B for qubits used in compu-
tation. Tracing out Alice’s subsystem reveals that Bob’s state
is maximally mixed.
Unlike many self-testing schemes, our goal is not to certify
that Alice and Bob share an EPR pair up to a local isome-
try. Instead we use the measured statistics to certify that for a
given measurement outcome on Alice’s device, Bob is in pos-
session of a state close to the ideal corresponding state up to
Protocol 1 Device-Independent Remote State Preparation
Input: Security parameters p and ε , and constant c≥ 1.
Steps:
1. Alice initialises counters kαβ = 0 and a correlation estimator
Cˆαβ = 0 for all α and β . She randomly partitions the N =
m+14cn˜ qubits that she will receive from Bob into m qubits
to be used for input preparation, and N−m qubits to be used
for verification from which she will randomly draw n˜ qubits
per measurement setting.
2. For 1≤ i≤ N
(a) Bob is asked to prepare a Bell pair 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), and
sends one half to Alice.
(b) If the received qubit is for verification, then
i. Alice randomly chooses an observable α and an
observable β , and increments the counter kαβ .
ii. Alice measures her state according to α , recording
the outcome aαβkαβ ∈ {−1,1}.
iii. Alice instructs Bob to measure his qubit according
to β .
iv. Bob measures his half of the prepared Bell pair
in the instructed basis, and sends his result bαβkαβ ∈{−1,1} to Alice.
v. Alice updates her correlation estimator
for this particular measurement setting
Cˆαβ = 1kαβ
[
(kαβ −1)Cˆαβ +aαβkαβ ·b
αβ
kαβ
]
.
(c) If the received qubit is for remote state preparation, then
i. Alice measures her half of the Bell pair in the ba-
sis {|+θ j 〉, |−θ j 〉}, where θ j is chosen uniformly
at random from A, if Bob’s corresponding qubit is
to be used for computation or for trap preparation.
If his qubit is to be used for dummy qubit prepara-
tion, Alice measures in {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}.
ii. If Alice’s measurement outcome is |+θ j 〉, then
Bob’s input qubit is |+−θ j 〉, whereas if her mea-
surement outcome is |−θ j 〉, then Bob’s input qubit
is |−−θ j 〉. If, instead, Alice measures in the com-
putational basis and the outcome is |s〉, where
s ∈ {0,1}, then Bob’s input qubit is |s〉. Alice
stores a classical label for Bob’s state in memory.
3. If
(
1− exp(−(n˜+m)ε2/8))3 (1−2exp(−(n˜+m)ε2/8))11≥
p, and |Cˆαβ − µαβ | ≤ ε , for all α and β , and µαβ is the
value of ideal correlation for a particular α and β , then the
protocol succeeds, otherwise it aborts. Alice also aborts if
she does not gather enough statistics about a certain subset
of correlations. The probability of this occurring decreases
exponentially with increasing c.
a local isometry. This is pictured in Fig. 1 for measurements
with only real coefficients and in Fig. 3 for measurements with
complex complex coefficients.
Protocol 1 shows how Alice can remotely prepare sin-
gle qubit states in Bob’s subsystem, up to isometry, with-
out revealing such states to Bob and in a completely device-
independent manner. The following theorem shows the cor-
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FIG. 2. IsometryΦ′ used to obtain information about complex
operations applied by Bob.
rectness of the protocol. That is, unless Alice aborts the pro-
tocol, Bob will be in possession, with probability at least p, of
qubit states ε˜-close to the ideal state.
Theorem 1. Let |ψ〉 be the untrusted state shared by Alice
and Bob. Given a projection Π±σA corresponding to the result
of Alice’s measurement of σA and that the measured correla-
tions in Protocol 1 are χ-close to the ideal correlations, there
exists a local isometry Φ¯ that extracts a state close to the de-
sired state on Bob’s side,∥∥∥Φ¯(√2Π±σSA |ψ〉S)−[(I +MSA)| junkσ 〉SΠ±ZQAΠ±σQB |φ+〉Q|0〉R
+ (I−MSB)| junkσ 〉SΠ±ZQA
(
Π±σQB
)∗ |φ+〉Q|1〉R]∥∥∥
2
≤ ε˜,
where ε˜ = O(χ1/4).
Proof. We start with an outline of the main idea behind the
proof. By considering the behaviour of the devices as given
by the gathered statistics, we show that the operators applied
by the devices on the untrusted state |ψ〉must follow commu-
tation and anti-commutation relations close to the ideal Pauli
operators applied on the ideal shared state |φ+〉, provided that
the measured statistics are close to the ideal statistics. Next we
construct a local isometry Φ¯=Φ◦Φ′, composed of a reduced
swap operation Φ and a phase-kickback operation Φ′. The
local isometry Φ¯ captures the fact that the statistics remain
unchanged under local change of basis, addition of ancillae,
change of the action of the observables outside of the support
of the state, and local embedding of the observables and states
in a different Hilbert space. Using the correlations shared by
the untrusted devices, we show that Φ¯ extracts a state close
to the desired ideal one. The role of the phase-kickback Φ′ is
to distinguish when the operations of the devices are complex
conjugated.
The first step uses a result obtained by McKague et al. in
[22] which establishes a bound on the maximum distance be-
tween an untrusted shared state and an ideal Bell pair, up
to local isometry, given statistics for correlations of mea-
surements {XA,ZA,DA} on Alice’s subsystem and {XB,ZB}
on Bob’s subsystem. By extending this approach to include
measurements with complex coefficients we obtain the maxi-
mum distance between the state that Alice’s measurement re-
motely prepares on Bob’s subsystem and the ideal input state.
Assume the real correlations are all at most χ-far from the
ideal case. This means that the actual correlations satisfy
〈ψ|XAXB|ψ〉 ≥ 1− χ , 〈ψ|ZAZB|ψ〉 ≥ 1− χ , |〈ψ|XAZB|ψ〉| ≤
χ , |〈ψ|DAXB|ψ〉 − 1√2 | ≤ χ , |〈ψ|DAZB|ψ〉 −
1√
2
| ≤ χ with
QA |0〉 H H
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|ψ〉
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FIG. 3. The total local isometry Φ¯ = Φ′ ◦Φ used in the self-
testing analysis of gathered statistics. Alice performs a mea-
surement of the observable σ . The isometry Φ¯ extracts the
corresponding state on Bob’s side as well as the information
about the complex phase of the applied measurement.
high probability. This leads to bounds on the action of the
measured observables,
‖(XAZA +ZAXA)|ψ〉‖2 ≤ 2ε1, (1a)
‖(XBZB +ZBXB)|ψ〉‖2 ≤ 2ε1−4ε2, (1b)
‖(XA−XB)|ψ〉‖2 ≤ ε2, (1c)
‖(ZA−ZB)|ψ〉‖2 ≤ ε2, (1d)
where ε1 = (1+
√
2)
√
(1+2
√
2)χ+
√
2χ+2
√
2χ and ε2 =√
2χ . Similar inequalities can be derived also for YA and YB
using the corresponding correlations such as 〈ψ|YAYB|ψ〉.
Bounds in Eq. (1c) and Eq. (1d) can be obtained by us-
ing the definition of the vector norm and using the fact that
measurements of XAXB and ZAZB are both nearly correlated.
Bounds on the anti-commutation of the measurement opera-
tors on the same subsystem in Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) require
more work. First, it can be shown from |〈ψ|XAZB|ψ〉| ≤ χ
that XB|ψ〉 and ZB|ψ〉 are nearly orthogonal and similarly for
Alice’s subsytem. This in turn leads to a nearly unitary opera-
tor 1√
2
(XB +ZB) which can be used to obtain Eq. (1b). Details
of this derivation can be found in Appendix C in [22].
Now we will discuss how the isometry Φ¯, presented in
FIG. 3, extracts the desired state and information about the
complex phase of the measurements. This approach is based
on a technique first introduced by McKague and Mosca in
[23]. Alice’s measurement projects the shared state in register
S to
√
2Π±σSA |ψ〉S, whereΠ
±
σSA
= 12 (I±σSA) is the correspond-
ing projector. For an outcome a of Alice’s measurement, the
isometry can be expressed as
Φ¯
(√
2Π±σSA |ψ〉S
)
=
1
4
√
2 ∑k,l∈{0,1}
(
I +(−1)lMSB
)
× XkSB
(
I +(−1)kZSB
)
(2)
× (I +(−1)aσSA) |ψ〉S|ak〉Q|l〉RB .
The action of this isometry is two-fold. The first part of the
isometry,Φ depicted in FIG. 1, swaps the states in registers SB
and QB. The second part of the isometry, Φ′ shown in FIG. 2,
requires a third register on Bob’s side, denoted by RB. The
5effect of this second part is to extract information about the
complex phase of the applied measurement.
The isometry Φ′ does not affect the state of the register
QB when Alice measures in basis XA or ZA. In particular,
by substituting these bases into Eq. (2) and considering the
ideal case when χ = 0 in Eq. (1), we see that the states
transform as
√
2Π±XSA |ψ〉S → | junkX 〉S2Π
±
ZQA
Π±XQB |φ
+〉Q and√
2Π±ZSA |ψ〉S→ | junkZ〉S2Π
±
ZQA
Π±ZQB |φ
+〉Q, where we do not
care about the state of the register S after the isometry. Us-
ing the fact that YA anti-commutes with XA and ZA (we are
still considering the case when χ = 0), we can establish that
YA → YQA MSA , where MSA is a unitary and similarly for YB.
This means that in the ideal case, for any measurement that
Alice performs, we have
Φ¯
(√
2Π±σSA |ψ〉S
)
=
1
2
[
(I +MB)| junkσ 〉S 1√pσ Π
±
ZQA
Π±σQB |φ
+〉Q|0〉RB (3)
+(I−MB)| junkσ 〉S 1√pσ Π
±
ZQA
(
Π±σQB
)∗ |φ+〉Q|1〉RB] ,
where pσ = 〈φ+|Π±ZQAΠ
±
σQA
|φ+〉. This shows that the register
QB contains the ideal desired state corresponding to Alice’s
measurement and the complex phase of the measurement is
controlled on the state of register RB.
Finally, we can consider the case when χ 6= 0. By com-
paring Eq. (2) with Eq. (3), along with the bounds in Eq. (1)
and repeated application of triangle inequality as in Appendix
A of [22], we obtain that the distance between the real state
and the ideal state, up to some local isometry, is at most
ε˜ = 12 (9ε1 + ε2).
What remains to be shown is the scaling of Alice’s confi-
dence about Bob’s state given the gathered statistics from self-
testing. We forgo the use of a Chernoff bound as this would
require the assumption of independent behaviour and would
compromise device-independence. Rather we adopt a simi-
lar approach to Pironio et al. [24]. The measurement process
forms a martingale with bounded increment which allows the
application of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality [25, 26].
Denote the set of all EPR pairs that Alice and Bob share by
S with cardinality |S |= N. This set can be partitioned into
the subset of pairs used in self-testing that are measured by
both Alice and Bob, Stest ⊂S with |Stest| = n, and the set
of pairs used for remote state preparation where only Alice
measures her subsystems, Sprep ⊂S with |Sprep| = m. We
also have N = n+m.
Consider an arbitrary subset S˜ ⊆ S that is again parti-
tioned as above, S˜ = S˜test ∪ S˜prep with corresponding car-
dinalities |S˜ | = n˜ + m˜. We can further partition the subset
of pairs used in self-testing according to the basis that the
qubits are measured in, S˜test = ∪α,β S˜ αβtest with n˜ =∑α,β n˜αβ ,
where S˜ αβtest is the subset of pairs where Alice measures in α
basis and Bob measures in β basis. Similarly we can parti-
tion S˜prep = ∪α,β S˜ αβprep with m˜ = ∑α,β m˜αβ . This may look
strange at first since we have stated that S˜prep is the subset of
EPR pairs that get measured only on Alice’s side. However,
in the upcoming theorem, it is useful to consider hypothetical
measurements in basis β by Bob.
The average ideal correlation over the subset S˜ can be writ-
ten as
µ˜ =
1
|S˜ | ∑α,β
(n˜αβ + m˜αβ )µ˜αβ ,
where µ˜αβ = 〈φ+|α⊗β |φ+〉 is the ideal correlation for a pair
measured in α by Alice and β by Bob. Denoting the classical
outcome of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement on the ith pair by
ai ∈ {−1,1} and bi ∈ {−1,1}, respectively, we can define a
random variable Cˆi = aibi. The average measured correlation
over the subset S˜ is then
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜
Cˆi =
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜test
Cˆi +
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜prep
Cˆi
=
1
|S˜ | ∑α,β
n˜αβ
(
µ˜αβ ± εαβ
)
(4)
+
1
|S˜ | ∑α,β
m˜αβ
(
µ˜αβ ± ε ′αβ
)
,
where εαβ represents the measured deviation from ideal cor-
relation for measurement αβ . For simplicity we set εαβ = ε
for all α,β . ε ′αβ is the hypothetical deviation from ideal cor-
relation obtained if Bob measured his qubits of S˜prep as well.
Since these qubits are in reality not measured we assume the
worst case scenario,
ε˜ ′αβ =

−2 when µ˜αβ = 1
−
(
1+ 1√
2
)
when µ˜αβ = 1√
2
1 when µ˜αβ = 0
1+ 1√
2
when µ˜αβ =− 1√
2
.
(5)
Again to simplify the notation we assume the most pessimistic
scenario and set |ε ′αβ | = 2 for all α,β . The real correla-
tion that the devices share is denoted by Ci(WA) = Pr(ai =
bi|WA)−Pr(ai 6= bi|WA), where WA denotes the history of Al-
ice’s instructions and measurements. The following theorem
bounds the probability that the real average correlation devi-
ates from the average ideal correlation by a large amount given
the statistics from Alice’s and Bob’s measurements.
Theorem 2. Given an arbitrary subset of EPR pairs, S˜ ⊆
S , and that the measured average correlation is µ˜ ± ε , the
probability that the real average correlation over this subset
is close to the ideal average correlation is given by
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜ Ci(WA)− µ˜
∣∣∣∣∣≤ 2n˜ε+m(2+ ε)n˜+m
)
≥ 1−2δ ,
(6)
where δ = exp(−(n˜+m)ε2/8).
Proof. We first look at the case when the measured average
correlation is µ˜+ ε . Define a new random variable,
Yk =
k
∑
i=1
[
Ci(WA)−Cˆi
]
,
6where k ∈ {0,1, . . . , |S˜ |}. The expected value of |Yn| is fi-
nite and the conditional expected value is E(Yk+1|WA) = Yk.
Also the random variable has a bounded increment, ck =
|Yk+1 −Yk| ≤ 2 for all k. Therefore the random variable Yk
is a martingale with bounded increment an so we can apply
the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
Pr
(
Y|S˜ | ≥ γ
)
≤ exp
(
− γ
2
2∑i∈S˜ c2i
)
. (7)
Choosing γ = |S˜|ε , Eq. (7) can rewritten as
Pr
(
1
|S˜ |
[
∑
i∈S˜
Ci(WA)− ∑
i∈S˜
Cˆi
]
≥ ε
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
|S˜ |ε2
)
.
Splitting the expression for the measured average correlation
as in Eq. (4) and assuming the worst case scenario, ε ′αβ = 2,
we get
Pr
(
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜
Ci(WA)− µ˜ ≥ 2n˜ε+ m˜(2+ ε)|S˜ |
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
|S˜ |ε2
)
(8)
Defining the martingale as Yk = ∑ki=1
[
Cˆi−Ci(WA)
]
, and fol-
lowing the same steps as above we arrive at a new bound,
Pr
(
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜
Ci(WA)− µ˜ ≤ m˜(2− ε)|S˜ |
)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
|S˜ |ε2
)
.
(9)
Combining Eq. (8) with Eq. (9), the probability that the av-
erage real correlation is close to the average ideal correlation
is
Pr
(
m˜(2− ε)
|S˜ | ≤
1
|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜
Ci(WA)− µ˜ ≤ 2n˜ε+ m˜(2+ ε)|S˜ |
)
≥ 1−2exp
(
−1
8
|S˜ |ε2
)
. (10)
The lower endpoint of the interval in Eq. (10) can be extended
while keeping the same lower bound on the probability,
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜ Ci(WA)− µ˜
∣∣∣∣∣≤ 2n˜ε+ m˜(2+ ε)|S˜ |
)
≥ 1−2exp
(
−1
8
|S˜ |ε2
)
.
Using m˜≤ m, we can extend the interval further
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1|S˜ | ∑i∈S˜ Ci(WA)− µ˜
∣∣∣∣∣≤ 2n˜ε+m(2+ ε)n˜+m
)
≥ 1−2δ ,
where δ = exp
(−(n˜+m)ε2/8). Identical expression is ob-
tained for the case when the average measured correlation is
µ˜− ε .
If we are interested in a particular correlation αβ , as in The-
orem 1, we can obtain the appropriate bound and probability
by setting S˜ to include all the pairs that are measured in the
basis αβ and no other pairs where both Alice and Bob mea-
sure. Also we set χ = 2n˜ε+m(2+ε)n˜+m in this case. It can be seen
that this is sufficient to imply Theorem 1 by considering an
initial set of n˜+m pairs, used to test a single correlation and
then randomly inserting an additional n˜ qubits of each addi-
tional correlation to be tested. The tests are then always such
that they can be considered to have been performed on sub-
sets of cardinality n˜+m, where the location of the m untested
qubits remains random.
Theorem 1 bounds the maximum distance between the ideal
state, shared between Alice and Bob, which we denote |ψABj 〉,
and the actual state |φABj 〉 that they share, up to local isometry
on Bob’s side (since the classical labels are stored in Alice’s
classical memory rather than her quantum device). It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that |ψABj 〉 represents the ideal two-qubit
state up to local isometry Φ. In other words, |ψABj 〉 is not it-
self in general a two-qubit state, just as performing a partial
trace of it over Alice’s subsystem does not in general result in
a single-qubit state on Bob’s subsystem. For any fixed value
of Alice’s classical register the reduced state on Bob’s side is
pure, denoted by |ψBj 〉, provided he follows the protocol hon-
estly. Expressing the distance between this ideal state and the
state obtained from a run of the protocol, in which Bob is not
constrained to be honest, in terms of the vector distance makes
it straightforward to obtain a lower bound on the fidelity of
Bob’s input state. Infidelity, introduced into the input state by
Bob’s dishonest behaviour, leads to an additive error in the
probability of the verification protocols of [9] accepting an in-
correct outcome.
Each of the verification protocols considered in [9] can be
viewed as a quantum channelP(ρ) which acts on a fixed CQ
correlated state. The probability of accepting a state orthogo-
nal to the output in the case of an honest run is then given by
the expectation value of the projector P⊥ onto the orthogonal
but accepted subspace. The initial state of Bob’s subsystem
is ρB = pρB≤ε˜ + (1− p)ρB>ε˜ , where p = (1− δ )3(1− 2δ )11
is the probability of preparing a state ρB≤ε˜ which is the result
from Alice’s measurement on her subsystem, where the bipar-
tite system |φABj 〉 was ε˜-close in vector distance to the ideal
state |ψABj 〉 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. ρB>ε˜ is defined in a similar
fashion. The probability of accepting an incorrect outcome is
given by
perror = Tr
(
P⊥P(ρB)
)
.
Substituting in the expression for ρB, perror becomes a sum
of three terms. The first term, pTr
(
P⊥P(|ψB〉〈ψB|)
)
,
represents the probability that Alice accepts the incor-
rect output given the correct input. The second term,
pTr
(
P⊥P(ρB≤ε˜ −|ψB〉〈ψB|)
)
, provides a correction to the
first term for a state ε˜-close to the correct input. Lastly,
(1− p)Tr(P⊥P(ρB>ε˜)) is the probability of accepting the
wrong output given an input state that is more than ε˜-far from
the correct input. Evaluating these expressions gives the final
7Protocol 2 Device-Independent Blind Quantum Computation
Input: On Alice’s side:
1. Security parameters p, ε and ∆.
2. A quantum computation expressed as a measurement
based computation on a cylindrical brickwork state of
m qubits, with measurement angles φ = (φi)1≤i≤m with
φi ∈ A, incorporating a set of trap qubits T and dummy
qubits D chosen as described in the main text and illus-
trated in Figure 4.
3. m random variables θi with values taken uniformly at
random from A.
4. A fixed function CG that for each non-output qubit i
computes the angle of the measurement to be sent to
Bob. This function depends on φi,θi,ri,xi and the re-
sult of the measurements that have been performed so
far, s<i (the definition of the function CG is identical
to the one found in [9], and its full description can be
found there).
Steps:
1. Alice and Bob engage in Protocol 1.
2. Bob takes his m states prepared in the previous step and en-
tangles them according to the cylindrical brickwork graph.
3. Alice sets all the values in s to be 0.
4. For i : 1≤ i≤ m
(a) Alice computes the angle δi = CG(i,φi,θi,ri,xi,s) and
sends it to Bob.
(b) Bob measures qubit i with angle δi and sends Alice the
result bi.
(c) Alice sets the value of si in s to be bi⊕ ri.
5. Alice accepts if bt = rt , for all traps t ∈ T .
bound on the probability of accepting an incorrect output,
perror ≤ p(1−∆)+ p‖ρB≤ε˜ −|ψB〉〈ψB|‖tr +(1− p),
where 1−∆ is the maximum probability of accepting an in-
correct outcome using the ideal initial state |ψB〉 and a multi-
trap variant of the verification scheme in Protocol 6 in [9].
This concludes phase one of our protocol which tests the
operation of Alice’s device and produces a separable input
state on Bob’s quantum computer with high probability. Al-
ice then proceeds with the computation by instructing Bob to
entangle the prepared qubits into a graph state, and use that
graph state to perform verifiable blind computation. The pro-
tocol they follow is given in Protocol 2, which is based on
Protocol 6 in [9]. We have modified the protocol found there
to have classical input and output only, and in order to make
it device-independent. Correctness follows directly from the
correctness of the unmodified protocol.
Protocol 6 of [9] uses a single qubit to detect Bob’s devi-
ation from Alice’s instructions making the protocol
(
1− 1m
)
-
verifiable. Alice randomly chooses a trap position t on a cylin-
drical brickwork state and prepares the rest of the qubits in
the same and neigbouring row in computational basis turn-
ing them into dummy qubits. Instructing Bob to apply entan-
gling operations according to the cylindrical brickwork graph
blindly produces a rectangular brickwork state in a tensor
product with a single trap that Alice uses for verification.
We modify this scheme to incorporate multiple trap qubits
and obtain a protocol that is (1−∆)-verifiable, where 0 < ∆<
1 is a constant. Alice starts with a cylindrical brickwork state
and chooses a set of trap qubits T , by randomly choosing a set
R of consecutive rows and fixes a 2-colouring on the graph,
taking all qubits in R of colour C are taken to be traps, as
illustrated in Fig. 4. She prepares the remaining qubits located
in the same rows as the trap qubits in the computational basis.
Additionally Alice also prepares the qubits in rows located
directly above and below R in the computational basis. We
refer to the set of qubits containing the trap qubits and the
dummy qubits prepared in the computational basis as a tape.
Alice then instructs Bob to entangle the qubits according to
the cylindrical brickwork graph which produces the brickwork
state in a tensor product with |T | trap qubits.
In order to achieve (1−∆)-verifiability for constant ∆< 12 ,
we require that the width of the tape scales in such a way that
|R| is a constant fraction 2∆ of the total number of rows of
the cylindrical brickwork state. The proof that this leads to
a constant probability of accepting an incorrect outcome of
the computation follows precisely the same steps as the proof
of Theorem 8 in [9] which proves
(
1− 1m
)
-verifiability of a
single-trap protocol, where the increased verifiability stems
directly from the increased probability that any given qubit is
a trap qubit. Correctness also follows directly from the cor-
rectness of Protocol 6 in [9]. Combining the multi-trap ver-
ification on cylindrical brickwork state with the self-testing
procedure leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Protocol 2 is (1− p∆+2p√mε˜)-verifiable, that
is the probability that an incorrect outcome is accepted at the
end of the verification procedure is
perror ≤ 1− p∆+2p
√
mε˜,
where p≥ (1−δ )3m(1−2δ )11m is Alice’s confidence that Bob
is in possession of an m-qubit input state close to the ideal
one, δ = exp
(− 18ε2(n˜+m)), and n˜+m = O(m4 lnm) is the
number of Bell pairs needed for self-testing per measurement
setting.
Proof. Expanding the expression for the bound on the vec-
tor distance between the shared state and the ideal state
up to isometry ‖|ψABj 〉 − |φABj 〉‖2 ≤ ε˜ , for all j, we get
Re〈ψABj |φABj 〉 ≥ 1− 12 ε˜2, which can be used to obtain a lower
bound on the fidelity between the states,
F(|ψABj 〉, |φABj 〉)≥
(
1− 1
2
ε˜2
)2
,
where we used F(|ψABj 〉, |φABj 〉) = |〈ψABj |φABj 〉|2 ≥
Re2〈ψABj |φABj 〉. The fidelity is non-decreasing under partial
trace which leads immediately to F(|ψBj 〉,ρBj ) ≥ (1− 12 ε˜2)2.
Fidelity is also multiplicative under tensor products which
81.    
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4.
Tape
Tape
FIG. 4. Multi-trap verification on a cylindrical brickwork
state: 1. Alice randomly selects a set of consecutive rows
R and assigns trap qubits to every qubit in R corresponding
to a random vertex colour in a two colouring of the graph. 2.
The remaining qubits in the selected tape are dummy qubits
and prepared in the computational basis. 3. Bob’s entangling
operation according to the cylindrical brickwork graph does
not entangle the trap qubits to the rest of the brickwork state.
4. Discarding the dummy qubits, we finally obtain a tensor
product of the brickwork state and the trap qubits.
leads to the following bound on the fidelity of the whole
m-qubit input state
F(|ψB〉,ρBρ≤ε˜ ) =
m
∏
j=1
F
(|ψBj 〉,ρBj ) ,
≥
(
1− 1
2
ε˜2
)2m
,
≥ 1−mε˜2,
where we take ε˜ to be the common upper bound on for all j.
Using the relationship between trace distance and fidelity,
1
2
‖ρB≤ε˜ −|ψB〉〈ψB|‖tr ≤
√
1−F(|ψB〉,ρB≤ε˜),
it follows that
‖ρB≤ε˜ −|ψB〉〈ψB|‖tr ≤ 2
√
mε˜.
Therefore the total probability of Alice accepting an incorrect
outcome is bounded by
perror ≤ p(1−∆)+ p
∥∥ρB≤ε˜ −|ψB〉〈ψB|∥∥tr +(1− p)
≤ 1− p∆+2p√mε˜. (11)
Expanding the expression for Alice’s confidence p and de-
manding that the confidence be close to unity, we obtain
n˜+m = Θ(ε−2 lnm). We would like to now find a scaling re-
lationship between ε and the input size m. Requiring that the
last term in Eq. (11) scale as a constant bounded from above
by p∆ leads to ε˜ = O(m−1/2). Using Theorem 1 we know that
ε˜ = O(ε1/4) which means that ε = O(m−2). This finally leads
to n˜+m = O(m4 lnm) which is the combined number of input
qubits and the number of Bell pairs needed per measurement
setting in the verification of remote state preparation.
Conclusion
Our scheme offers a large improvement over current
schemes [13, 15] that achieve a similar function. Splitting
the computation into two parts, namely device-independent
remote state preparation followed by authenticated computa-
tion, presents a distinct advantage. At all stages of phase one
we only need to self-test individual EPR pairs, unlike the ap-
proach in [15] that self-tests the entire graph state. This re-
sults in the number of repetitions of their protocol to be N ≥
316 ·1038.7 ·n22, where n is the number of vertices of the graph.
It is worth noting that the client in [15] is completely classi-
cal and the protocol requires n non-communicating servers,
each holding one vertex of the graph state. The protocol of
Reichardt et al. [13] also considers a fully classical client and
a constant number of non-communicating quantum servers.
The client relies on CHSH games to test the shared states as
well as the operation of the servers. To authenticate the whole
computation, the client uses the servers to implement state and
process tomography. This introduces a large overhead, where
the leading term is of the order at least n8192, where n counts
the number of gates needed to implement the computation.
9We note that in recent and independent work from the re-
sults reported here, Gheorghiu, Kashefi and Wallden have also
considered splitting the verification problem into a remote
state preparation followed by authenticated blind computa-
tion [27]. A major difference between their results and ours,
is that their protocol utilizes the CHSH rigidity approach of
[13], rather than Bell pair self-testing, resulting in overhead
which scales as nc for a constant c > 2048.
In contrast to these other methods, the protocol de-
scribed here requires an overhead in resources that scales as
O(m4 lnm) where m is the number of vertices used in the com-
putation. While this represents a drastic increase in efficiency
over other existing schemes, further reducing overhead re-
mains an important open question.
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